We need not do so today, however. First, if we accept the test for Chapter 93A violation Scholz claims Atkinson frames, the district court's award here will not stand because there has not been an extortionate element to the breach: Scholz tried to hold on to Ahern's money, but he was not using the breach "to force [Ahern] to do what otherwise [he] would not be legally required to do." [17]   Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co. , 754 F.2d at 18 (affirming Chapter 93A award where defendant withheld payment as a "wedge" to force plaintiff to supply more products); see , e.g. , Anthony's Pier Four , 583 N.E.2d at 822 (holding that withholding approval as a pretext to force party into changing price of underlying contract violated Chapter 93A).

Second, if we were to find that Atkinson does not limit Chapter 93A liability to cases with an extortionate element, but rather address Scholz' acts under the test as stated in Anthony's Pier Four , we still find that Chapter 93A has not been violated. That test asks whether there has been conduct "'in disregard of known contractual arrangements' and intended to secure benefits for the breaching party." Anthony's Pier Four , 583 N.E.2d at 821; see Wang Labs. , 501 N.E.2d at 1165 (finding liability under Chapter 93A where interference with contract "constituted a willful act calculated to obtain the benefits of [the] contract . . . without cost and in disregard of known contractual arrangements"). Here, the court found that Scholz knowingly breached the contract in order to gain a benefit -- Ahern's share of the royalties. But that would be true of any knowing breach of a contract. The question, then, is whether the level of "rascality" is sufficient to rise to the level of a violation of Chapter 93A. We find it is not. First, while the deductions that the court deemed commercially unreasonable ate up more than half of the royalties reported, we note that Scholz did not seek to conceal the nature of the deductions: he laid them out on the Scholz Statement in varying levels of detail. Next, while Scholz has an extensive degree of control over the moneys from the third album, there has been no allegation that he did not report all of the royalties from MCA on the Scholz Statement. Evidence was presented that the number of hours spent on the album was reconstructed after the fact, but the district court did not find that the figures given were inaccurate, just that they were not deductible. Scholz' breach amounted to more than a dispute over the commercial reasonableness of certain deductions, as he would have us believe. Nonetheless, his acts did not rise to the level of rascality required for Chapter 93A liability. [18] Ultimately, therefore, we conclude that the district court erred as a matter of law in finding Scholz violated Chapter 93A, and reverse that holding.

PREJUDGMENT INTEREST AND ATTORNEY'S FEES

As we have found that Scholz did not violate Chapter 93A, we need not address the parties' arguments regarding the award of attorney's fees under that statute. Nor do we weigh Ahern's cross-appeal of the district court's refusal to award prejudgment interest, since that is based on his Chapter 93A contention. See Mass. Gen. L. ch. 231 § 6C ("interest shall be added . . . to the amount of damages, at the contract rate, if established, or at the rate of twelve percent per annum from the date of the breach or demand."). It does not apply to his breach of contract claim, as that was brought under New York law. See Aubin v. Fudala , 782 F.2d 287, 289 (1st Cir. 1986) (noting that "[w]hen a Plaintiff secures a jury verdict based on state law, the law of that state governs the award of prejudgment interest.").

No costs on appeal to either party.