We review the district court's findings of law de novo , and only set aside its findings of fact if "clearly erroneous." See Industrial Gen. Corp. v. Sequoia Pacific Sys. Corp. , 44 F.3d 40, 43 (1st Cir. 1995); see , e.g. , Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co. v. Checkers, Inc. , 754 F.2d 10, 17 (1st Cir. 1985). "A finding of fact is '"clearly erroneous" when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.'" Industrial Gen. , 44 F.3d at 43 (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City , 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (citation omitted)). "Although whether a particular set of acts, in their factual setting, is unfair or deceptive is a question of fact, the boundaries of what may qualify for consideration as a [Chapter] 93A violation is a question of law." Schwanbeck v. Federal-Mogul Corp. , 578 N.E.2d 789, 803 (Mass. 1991), rev'd on other grounds , 592 N.E.2d 1289 (Mass. 1992).

B. The District Court's Findings

The district court determined that Scholz had violated sections 2 and 11 through his failure to pay Ahern royalties from the third album, and made the following findings in its Memorandum and Order. First, it found that Scholz agreed to pay Ahern royalties after deduction of only a producer's royalty and all commercially reasonable recording expenses. Second, the court held that the Scholz Statement constituted an unfair and deceptive business practice. More specifically, it found that the deductions taken for legal fees, payment to Jeff Dorenfeld, time spent in the studio, and the resulting recording costs were all not commercially reasonable recording expenses. Rather, the court stated, $500,000 in recording expenses would be commercially reasonable. It next found that Scholz' Statement was

a deliberate and blatant attempt to deprive the Plaintiff Ahern of monies rightfully due and owing to him as royalties from the sales of the third Boston album. Such egregious conduct . . . is patently an unfair and deceptive practice. The submission of [the Scholz Statement] as an accounting by Scholz to Ahern is a shocking display of arrogant disdain for Ahern's contractual rights and was rendered in obvious bad faith.

(District Court Memorandum and Order, page 3).

Scholz challenges the sufficiency of these findings. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) mandates that courts "find the facts specially and state separately [their] conclusions of law thereon" when trying facts without a jury. See , e.g. , Montañez v. Bagg , 510 N.E.2d 298, 300 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987) (noting that judge did not make detailed findings of fact regarding Chapter 93A claims under Mass. R. Civ. P. 52(a)). Scholz notes that the court did not state that the deductions were actually deceptive, and reminds us that the Scholz Statement set forth in some detail what each of the deductions were. Since the court did not make more specific findings as to unfair or deceptive practices, he maintains, we should reverse the Chapter 93A finding against him. [15]   See Schwanbeck , 578 N.E.2d at 803 (holding that district court finding of Chapter 93A violation lacked foundation in the court's subsidiary findings).

However, we remind Scholz that under Rule 52(a) "the judge need only make brief, definite pertinent findings and conclusions on the contested matters." Makuc v. American Honda Motor Co. , 835 F.2d 389, 394 (1st Cir. 1987). Here, the district court found that Scholz breached the FMA, that four of his deductions were commercially unreasonable, while a figure of $0.5 million would be reasonable; and that the Scholz Statement was "a deliberate and blatant attempt to deprive" Ahern of moneys owed him. It is a question of law whether this attempt to deprive Ahern rises to the level of a violation of Chapter 93A, as the lower court held, and we believe the decision includes enough of a basis for the Chapter 93A finding to save the decision from remand. The district court has provided us with more than mere conclusions. See Sidney Binder, Inc. , 552 N.E.2d at 572 (holding that explanatory findings were necessary where court merely recited the evidence without making findings and concluded that "neither party ha[d] sustained its burden of proof" that Chapter 93A had been violated). We note, however, that our task would have been much simpler in this and other issues had the district court seen fit to explicate more of its decision-making on paper. There is a gap between finding that deductions are commercially unreasonable and finding that the Scholz Statement as a whole is an attempt to deprive Ahern deserving of the modifiers "unfair" and "deceptive": while we are willing to follow the lower court across the distance between them, a bridge would have been more than welcome.

C. Scholz' Challenge to the Chapter 93A Findings

Having set forth our standard of review and the findings of the district court, we turn to the heart of Scholz' challenge to the Chapter 93A award. As noted above, whether an act was unfair and/or deceptive is a question of fact. Based on our review of the evidence, we do not hesitate to find that the district court's findings of fact are not clearly erroneous, and we will not disturb them. [16]   See United Truck Leasing Co. v. Geltman , 533 N.E.2d 647, 653 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989), aff'd , 551 N.E.2d 20 (Mass. 1990). Thus, we assess the lower court's award under Chapter 93A in the light of its finding that four deductions -- which totalled $4.2 million -- were not reasonable, but $0.5 million would be commercially reasonable recording costs, and that the Scholz Statement was a deliberate attempt to deprive Ahern of his percentage of the royalties from the third album. We ask now whether these facts rise to the level of a violation of Chapter 93A, section 11.

There is no clear definition of what conduct constitutes an "unfair or deceptive" act. Mass. Gen. L. ch. 93A, § 11. The Massachusetts courts "have noted, however, that '[t]he statute "does not contemplate an overly precise standard of ethical or moral behavior. It is the standard of the commercial marketplace."'" Shepard's Pharmacy, Inc. v. Stop & Shop Cos. , 640 N.E.2d 1112, 1115 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) (quoting USM Corp. v. Arthur D. Little Sys., Inc. , 546 N.E.2d 888 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989)), review granted , 644 N.E.2d 226 (1994). In the extensive case law on Chapter 93A, "a common refrain has developed. 'The objectionable conduct must attain a level of rascality that would raise an eyebrow of someone inured to the rough and tumble of the world of commerce.'" Quaker State , 884 F.2d at 1513 (quoting Levings v. Forbes & Wallace Inc. , 396 N.E.2d 149, 153 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979)). In short, a chapter 93A claimant must show that the defendant's actions fell "within at least the penumbra of some common-law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness," or were "immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous," and resulted in "substantial injury . . . to competitors or other businessmen."

Id. (quoting PMP Assocs., Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co. , 321 N.E.2d 915, 917 (Mass. 1975)). In evaluating whether an act or practice is unfair, we assess "the equities between the parties," including what both parties knew or should have known. Swanson v. Bankers Life Co. , 450 N.E.2d 577, 580 (Mass. 1983).

It is well established that breach of a contract can lead to a violation of Chapter 93A. See , e.g. , Anthony's Pier Four, Inc. v. HBC Assocs. , 583 N.E.2d 806, 821 (Mass. 1991). The simple fact that a party knowingly breached a contract does not raise the breach to the level of a Chapter 93A violation, however. Cf. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co. , 754 F.2d at 18 (stating that "mere breaches of contract, without more, do not violate [C]hapter 93A."). In the breach of contract context, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has "said that conduct 'in disregard of known contractual arrangements' and intended to secure benefits for the breaching party constitutes an unfair act or practice for [Chapter] 93A purposes." Anthony's Pier Four , 583 N.E.2d at 821; see Wang Labs., Inc. v. Business Incentives, Inc. , 501 N.E.2d 1163, 1165 (Mass. 1986). Relying on the Appeals Court of Massachusetts' decision in Atkinson v. Rosenthal , 598 N.E.2d 666 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992), Scholz seeks to limit this test. There, the court examined a series of breach of contract cases and concluded that [t]here is in those cases a constant pattern of the use of a breach of contract as a lever to obtain advantage for the party committing the breach in relation to the other party; i.e., the breach of contract has an extortionate quality that gives it the rancid flavor of unfairness. In the absence of conduct having that quality, a failure to perform obligations under a written lease, even though deliberate and for reasons of self-interest, does not present an occasion for invocation of [Chapter] 93A remedies.