To the extent that this represents a departure from the case law, it is only a minor one, an incremental step in the right direction ( see Rooney v Tyson, 91 NY2d 685, 693–94). Asthe federal district court was correct to acknowledge, New York has not strictly limited special injury to the imposition of provisional remedies, and the intermediate appellate courts have allowed such claims based on involuntary bankruptcy filings ( Stokes v Kase, 51 AD2d 983; Sachs v Weinstein, 208 AD 360), as well as prior mental illness proceedings ( Reade v Halpin, 193 AD 566; see also, Groat v Town Bd of Town of Glenville, supra, 73 AD2d, at 429–430, appeal dismd, 50 NY2d 928; J.J. Theatres v VROK Co., 96 NYS2d 271, 273). We now revisit the statement over a century ago in Willard that all that is required is some added grievance, for which the imposition of provisional remedies serves as but one of a more expansive set of examples ( see, Willard v Holmes, Booth & Haydens, supra, 142 NY, at 495).

We likewise decline to carve out a special rule for attorneys, which the plaintiff and amicus suggest. No merit devolves to this area of law in departing from a general standard for all. We, of course, recognize the valuable role that attorneys play in the administration of justice and the necessity to be free from conflicts of interest that may impair the representation of clients. Failing extreme necessity, however, special standards for malicious prosecution claims brought by attorneys or other professional groups are unwarranted from a practical or a policy perspective. A malicious civil prosecution, then, is one that is begun in malice, without probable cause to believe it can succeed, and which, afterimposing a grievance akin to the effect of a provisional remedy, finally ends in failure ( see, Burt v Smith, supra, 181 NY, at 5).

The allegations of injury presented to this Court by the facts of the certified question, nonetheless, fall short of this standard. The question itself begs us to assume that an attorney–client relationship was "actually undermined," but on the facts given to us, we cannot so conclude. In general, Engel complains about the burdens imposed by the conflict of interest created when CBS sued him. The amount of time and costs of rendering adequate counsel were increased, discovery burdens increased, some of which Engel did not or could not, according to the Second Circuit, charge to his client. These do not rise to the level of atypical consequences of a lawyer being sued. Avoiding conflicts and dealing with actual conflicts are part and parcel of the lawyer's profession, and here, under the facts presented, Scholz agreed to continue notwithstanding the conflict and Engel prevailed. It is true that his burden was slightly increased but, as described, the burden did not form the critical mass necessary to be cognizable as special injury. The conflicts may have been virtually insurmountable, but the fact remains that Engel did surmount them, apparently without diminishing his client's chances of ultimately prevailing.

This does not mean that because Engel won for his client he cannot show the requisite added grievance. Nor should it suggest that Engel had to have been disbarred, disciplined,disqualified or dismissed in order to get his malicious prosecution claim to the jury. But here, nothing in the specific facts presented to us gives a basis for concluding that the burden, financial or otherwise, of strategizing around the conflict was substantially beyond that which would be typical of similar litigation.

The claims in the facts presented to us of lost business likewise fail to muster the requisite special injury. These claims are actually tangential to the main claims of an increased work burden due to the conflicts, and are primarily asserted in general rather than specific terms. Even though we can foresee specific, verifiable loss of business providing the necessary grievance, the loss of one client along with vague allegations of reputational loss, given Engel's established practice, are not sufficient. Moreover, there has been no allegation that the consequences, in terms of lost business, have marred, in any specific and meaningful way, Engel's or his law firm's financial opportunities.

To be certain, CBS's actions in bringing a groundless claim for the purposes of creating a conflict were reprehensible. Cases brought for the primary purpose of interfering with an attorney–client relationship or of curtailing another's business opportunities not only waste precious judicial resources, but are also anathema to the justice system itself. Nonetheless, we are constrained by the fact that standards for awarding fees andcosts and imposing sanctions are different than those for a claim of malicious prosecution. Under the facts of this certified question, the deleterious consequences strongly desired by CBS in bringing its action never materialized to the degree necessary to constitute special injury. As a result, we do not assume that the attorney–client relationship was "actually undermined" as the certified question suggests, and with this understanding, we answer the certified question in the negative.

We note, however, that only the certified question and not the question of summary judgment is before this Court, and we offer no ultimate conclusion as to whether Engel has raised a question of fact to defeat summary judgment. We rely solely on the facts presented by the certified question. Other averred allegations or facts, not before this Court, may have a bearing on this determination. On certified questions, our province is bounded by "questions of New York law * * * which may be determinative" (22 NYCRR § 500.17[b]). We leave the final resolution of the summary judgment motion to the Second Circuit in light of the legal standard set forth in this Opinion ( see, Liriano v Hobart Corp., 92 NY2d 232, 236).

Accordingly, construing the question as we do, the certified question should be answered in the negative.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Following certification of a question by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and acceptance of the question by this Court pursuant to section 500.17 of the Rules of Practice of the New York State Court of Appeals, and after hearing argument by counsel for the parties and consideration of the briefs and the record submitted, certified question answered in the negative. Opinion by Judge Ciparick. Judges Bellacosa, Smith, Levine and Wesley concur. Chief Judge Kaye and Judge Rosenblatt took no part.

Decided April 6, 1999

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